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During the Middle Ages most major secular and ecclesiastical households in 
Britain and Ireland employed an official called an almoner to deal with charitable 
giving. As the ultimate aristocrat, the crown too had an almoner for England and 
Wales, Ireland and Scotland. In present-day Britain the queen’s almoner (currently the 
bishop of Manchester) is best known for distributing Maundy money, but in the 
medieval and early modern period he was a far more important figure. Half a century 
ago Lawrence Tanner published a list of English almoners and sub-almoners, but 
what is known of their functions comes from incidental references in literature about 
ecclesiastical life and the royal household, with court preaching most extensively 
studied.
2
 Then in 1990 Michael MacDonald and Terence Murphy attributed to the 
almoner a central political and fiscal role in the ‘Tudor revolution in government’: the 
enforcement of draconian penalties against suicides.
3
 Those found by a coroner’s 
inquest to have killed themselves consciously and deliberately (called felones de se) 
forfeited their moveable property to the crown; the blameless (non compotes mentis) 
suffered no penalty. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries nearly all 
coroners’ inquests returned verdicts of felo de se on suicides. Perplexed by why 
members of communities should have chosen publicly to persecute their hapless 
neighbours over what they imply was a private tragedy, MacDonald and Murphy 
sought a powerful external agent to enforce material penalties - and found him in the 
royal almoner, who had delegated rights to collect and distribute such forfeitures.  
In a highly speculative discussion, MacDonald and Murphy claim the almoner 
was able to secure large sums for himself, his master or mistress by policing coroners’ 
inquests into registering verdicts of felo de se and by stopping family from asserting 
control over assets after a relative’s suicide. They portray almoners as rapacious and 
eagle-eyed royal officials, operating through the ‘politically intimidating and legally 
nimble’ courts of Star Chamber and King’s or Queen’s Bench to enforce forfeitures, 
which royal grants gave to successive almoners.
4
 We are told that they enforced a 
legalistic set of ethics (that suicide was wrong and needed to be punished) along with 
the material penalties that bolstered them against a desire by family and community to 
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treat suicide more leniently. Their motive was partly political centralisation and partly 
manipulation of what Joel Hurstfield called ‘fiscal feudalism’.5 Occasionally 
MacDonald and Murphy refer to the almoner’s duty ‘to treat the survivors of suicides 
and the forfeiters of deodands mercifully’, yet claim that such obligations seem rarely 
to have interfered with the enrichment of the almoner and his monarch.
6
  
While presented as the deus ex machina of suicide verdicts, the charitable role, 
judicial involvements and political functions of early-modern royal almoners remain 
obscure – even to those doing detailed work on the lives of bishops who were 
almoners – because much of their work was behind the scenes.7 This article is an 
attempt to shed new light on almoners by exploring: what they actually did, 
principally in the enforcement of the law on suicide; their conception of ‘charity’ in 
handling the affairs of felones de se; and the benevolent uses to which they put 
forfeited assets. While apparently focusing on an ‘odd man out’, suicide, the article 
sheds new light on the ideological basis and practical impact of the almoner’s 
involvement with Tudor and Stuart society at large, rather than simply his function at 
court.
8
  
As holder of a national franchise to collect deodands and the goods of felons 
of themselves, the almoners of England and Wales and of Ireland were less 
instruments of the crown than its semi-independent servants, exercising through a 
royal grant ‘public jurisdiction in private hands.’9 Their role is best envisaged as an 
extension of a place at the royal court or as part of the domestic establishments of the 
nobility, which ‘were equally committed to a combination of practical provisioning 
and socio-cultural displays of power. In its upper echelons the aristocratic household 
existed to articulate and enhance the reputation of its head: senior servants personated 
and expressed his qualities.’10 The almoner performed a broadly traditional charitable 
function, understood not only as beneficence, but also as creating and recreating a 
Christian community. Responding to a need for both law and lordship in a changing 
social and legal environment, he blended (in Sir Paul Vinogradoff’s terms) the 
universalism of canon law with the narrow issues of loyalty within feudal law.
11
  
Forfeiture by felones de se combined the parts into two goals. First was 
compensation to a lord for a breach of fidelity (the most basic meaning of the word 
‘felony’) and the exercise of his responsibilities to dependants. The letter of the law 
allowed crown or ‘society’ to be ‘in some part revenged [on suicides], by depriving 
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them of power to dispose of their Estate’, but intervention was as much a reflection of 
attempts pragmatically to settle the affairs of all the dead as it was a comment on self-
murder itself.
12
 Second was an obligation to act ‘for God’s love’ both in a lord’s own 
interventions and in the relationships he sought to build or re-build among those with 
whom he dealt. For Vinogradoff ‘the two influences meet in conflict and in 
compromise’.13 As we shall see towards the end of this article, Ireland’s almoner was 
like that for England and Wales, but he operated in a different institutional and social 
environment. The royal almoner in Scotland had a quite different role, which 
illustrates the profound dissimilarities in the political, social and religious complexion 
of the component parts of Britain. 
 
‘Technically, “almoner” refers to one who solicits alms, collects and 
distributes them.’14 Found in all large households of the Middle Ages, most were 
clerics charged with fulfilling expectations of charity and piety, even if some look like 
chamberlains or accountants because they were involved in getting and spending 
money; those belonging to the sixteenth-century London charitable hospitals look like 
wardens.
15
 The royal almoner, variously known as the Great or (Lord) High Almoner, 
was such a figure writ large. The post is first referred to in 1103 and in 1177 Roger 
the Templar was chosen almoner by Henry II ‘with the wise counsel of his bishops 
and other wise men’ to hear claims and to receive a tenth of food and drink from the 
royal household for distribution to the poor.
16
 Early almoners and sub-almoners alike 
were probably appointed by word of mouth and this may have remained true even in 
later times when they subsequently received formal, open ‘letters patent’: written 
grants may have been issued only when there was some need to assert privileges. The 
first recorded grant of deodands to an almoner by letters patent under the great seal 
‘for maintenance of the King’s Alms’ comes in 1421 to John Snell.17 Two other 
grants in the following decade go out of their way to state that ‘deodands have always 
belonged to the almoner of the king’s household in sustentation of the king’s alms’.18 
This may have been argumentative rather than descriptive, for in 1400 a serjeant at 
arms and another man from the county were commissioned to enquire into unsold 
deodands in Suffolk during the previous decade, to render proceeds of sales to the 
king’s almoner and to account for them to the king’s council; nothing came of the 
initiative.
19
 In 1476 the title of High Almoner was first bestowed on Thomas Danett, 
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though in a subsequent grant Master Danett is still described as ‘the king’s servant’.20 
Danett too seems to have been doing the job before he received his patent.
21
 
In the fifteenth century most senior English churchmen had been turned into 
purely spiritual authorities, but the crown returned to one ecclesiastic as figurehead 
confiscations that it had wrested from most bishops as lords during the Middle Ages.
22
 
This realigned an abiding coalition between church and crown. It carried on medieval 
institutions to pursue ideals that blended traditional Christianity with the revived 
classical ideas of civic humanism that characterised the Renaissance, as well as 
helping to fill a legal gap caused by the decline of aspects of church court and 
manorial jurisdiction. The franchisal privileges granted to almoners from the fifteenth 
century (and perhaps before) built on a tradition of clerical involvement in many areas 
of life, most notably the enforcement of obligations in wills and contracts, the original 
justification for canonical involvement in which had been to ensure implementation of 
charitable bequests and, more broadly, to protect conscience, confidence and moral 
object.
23
  
Forfeiture for felony originated in the thirteenth century and until the sixteenth 
century proceeds could go to help a soul pass through Purgatory (‘deodand’ meant 
something given to God in expiation).
24
 For example, in 1321 a London Sheriff 
ordered that the forfeited goods of a woman ‘should be given in alms for the soul of 
the same Joan, and the king would concern himself no more with those chattels’.25 
After the Reformation discountenancing certain types of religious giving meant that 
charitable donations went to different ends. Poor relief was an obvious destination in 
the century after 1530 thanks to short-term disruptions to existing provision: the 
dissolutions of the 1530s and 1540s, for example, ‘devastated local relief 
capabilities’.26 Benevolence was refocused by Edwardian legislation that clarified 
legitimate charitable uses.
27
 To these politico-religious changes was added in the later 
sixteenth century the more evident problem of structural poverty.
28
 Judged by 
indicators such as the number of Star Chamber suits, the almoner was most active 
between the 1570s and 1630s, the period when both leading by example and 
managing by intervention were most needed to shape benevolence; the highest rate of 
suits came in the reign of Elizabeth at just over eight a year.
29
 
Being almoner had attractions. One was proximity to the monarch. A drawing 
of the king’s table from the time of Edward IV shows the almoner sitting at his right 
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hand while Thomas More cites an example of ‘doctor Mayo’ (Richard Mayhew, 
almoner since 1497) offering wisdom to Henry VII at table.
30
 The office also had 
perquisites, though very few formal emoluments. Almoners seem to have received 
expenses or ‘diet’ and perhaps pensions, but it is unclear if these were ex officio 
except for Walter Felde (1483) whose patent includes ‘all accustomed fees’.31 Only 
much later were England’s royal almoners salaried and even then they sometimes had 
to give royal alms from their own pockets.
32
 Imprecision about what the job offered 
was matched by vagueness in what was expected of its holder, though it is clear that 
being almoner was far from a sinecure.
33
 Like any servant to an important person, he 
worked within an open-ended understanding of service, which meant he could 
legitimately be asked to do anything not incompatible with his personal honour or 
ecclesiastical calling.
34
 This broad and formally unaccountable remit explains why the 
work of the almoner is so obscure.  
In the early Tudor period he presided over a department within the royal 
household called the Almonry. According to David Loades, the development of the 
privy chamber as a distinct household organisation (starting in the 1490s, but really 
taking off in the 1520s) resulted in the king’s charitable ‘offerings’ increasingly being 
made by the chief gentleman of the privy chamber rather than the almoner himself: 
‘This left the Almonry with the main task of distributing the “broken meats” from the 
royal tables to the poor who (theoretically) clustered at the palace gate. In practice, 
many of the poor seem to have infiltrated the palace and helped themselves, while the 
Almoner’s “doles” were either sent to convenient charitable foundations or sold to 
other catering institutions and the money given to suitable causes.’35  
If Loades is correct about the almoner’s duties, it might be another sign of the 
creeping demotion of the clerical estate by the 1530s: the almoner, being a cleric, was 
being sidelined in the high-profile side of his work by a courtier. Some of what the 
almoner gave certainly came from the privy chamber. A royal commission of 1552, 
investigating crown revenue and expenditure, showed that the king’s offerings, daily 
alms, privy alms and giving on Palm Sunday, Maunday Thursday and Easter were 
paid by the treasurer of the king’s chamber.36 The commission’s report makes no 
mention of the royal almoner – or of deodands or the goods of felons of themselves - 
but a royal warrant of 1550 gave £240 to Richard Cox (1547) for the previous year 
and £20 a month thereafter ‘to be emploied upon his Majesties privie almes’.37 Four 
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years later Queen Mary issued a warrant to the treasurer of the chamber to give Dr 
William Bill, chief almoner, 5s 5d: ‘to be by him distributed every day at the Court 
gate’.38 There are other examples of routine grants of this kind, but tracing the source 
and course of giving is otherwise largely impossible.
39
 What is clear is that funds 
from the privy chamber were only part of those at the almoner’s disposal. His patent 
shows he had his own purse and the ways he used it can occasionally be 
documented.
40
 
Despite the wording of the 1554 grant, it seems unlikely that either the 
gentleman or the almoner dealt personally with mundane handouts unless there was 
some public point to be made. Indeed the almoner himself had a special place as well 
as his own means. He was a personal appointee, always in the royal gaze and with an 
important public profile which created opportunities to excel at some task. Promoted 
to almoner in 1509, Wolsey made his name arranging major holiday banquets, but 
Princess Mary’s Welsh household had an almoner who refused to do this and her 
chief advisor was forced to write to ex-almoner, now chief-minister, Wolsey for 
advice on Christmas and Twelfth Night banquets.
41
 The almoner was an important 
figure in his own right, though exactly what he made of the job was an individual 
matter dependent on his character and relationship with his lord or lady. Wolsey 
exemplifies the fact that being almoner normally served as a stepping stone to 
something better; four other Henrician almoners went on to become archbishops of 
York. A singular mark of favour in itself, it would have been sensible for the almoner 
to cooperate with other courtiers – like the chief gentleman of the privy chamber - if 
he wanted further royal patronage. Yet the gentleman operated in the closed 
environment of the privy chamber while the almoner was an intermediary between the 
court and the wider society. 
There were other conduits for power and personality open to the capable and 
ambitious. Richard Cox was personal tutor to the future Edward VI and was put in 
overall charge of his education when formally made the prince’s almoner in 1544; he 
became High Almoner in 1547.
42
 Cox is a good example of the multi-functional role 
of early and mid-Tudor almoners and a reminder that until the late-Tudor and Stuart 
period not all almoners were bishops when appointed. He was a moderate Protestant 
who was important in creating a reformed climate around Edward VI and he was later 
a conscientious bishop of Ely.
43
 Protector Somerset, who himself retained a master of 
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requests to perform some functions comparable with the almoner’s, sent Cox on a 
preaching mission to Sussex ‘to appeace the people by his goode doctryne, whiche 
arre nowe trobeled through the sediciouse preachinge’ of the bishop of Chichester and 
others.
44
 Early Tudor almoners had a wide range of other jobs beyond preaching and 
counselling. They served as foreign envoys (as had their fifteenth-century 
predecessors) and were expected to promote the monarchy at home by ensuring, for 
example, that church bells were rung to greet the ruler on processions around London 
– and fining churches whose bells were silent.45 They also pursued fines for breaches 
of the orders on Lent observance.
46
  
This already long list does not exhaust their tasks, for they could be 
arbitrators, mediators or adjudicators in the best tradition of equity, the most vibrant 
branch of the English law in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. One example from 
Staffordshire in 1503 involved Richard Mayhew enjoining disputants over land to 
‘contynue in love and charite’.47 Mayhew was involved in another land dispute in 
Shropshire earlier the same year.
48
 An example from Lancashire in March 1512 is the 
award of Robert Bekinsale, chaplain and almoner to Katherine of Aragon, and 
Richard Dalton, between James Dalton the elder and Gilbert Nelson (like Bekinsale, 
early almoners tend to be styled clerk, confessor or chaplain to a king or queen in the 
patent rolls).
49
 In 1525 Bekinsale was involved in brokering a high-level marriage 
settlement in Cornwall.
50
 Finally, royal almoners had judicial roles, of which the most 
important was to sit on the panel that presided over the early Tudor ‘Whitehall Court’ 
or Court of Requests: a civilian-dominated conciliar tribunal with equitable 
jurisdiction which existed to hear ‘poor men’s causes’ and which dealt with private 
matters, where Star Chamber handled public ones.
51
 Richard Mayhew sat in both 
courts during the 1490s.
52
 This judicial role fell into abeyance when the judges or 
‘Masters of Requests’ were given a more formal standing in the late 1530s.53 
The royal almoner’s role became both more specialised and more wide-
ranging over time. Almoners were at best mid-ranking clerics at Court in the later 
years of Henry VIII’s reign and, under Elizabeth, usually bishops of lesser sees – 
perhaps a sign that, if the senior clerical estate had indeed suffered under the early 
Tudors, it later recovered.
54
 By the Elizabethan period almoners acted as principal 
preachers at Court and trustees for the queen’s charities. Both Elizabeth and James I 
saw the deanery of the Chapel Royal as dispensable, reinforcing the almoner’s 
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seniority and confirming his post as the highest court office automatically available to 
a bishop.
55
 Royal almoners gave important sermons to and on behalf of the monarch 
and can thus be seen as the crown’s religious, moral and ecclesiastical face (and 
conscience); Lancelot Andrewes (1605) was probably the most distinguished later 
court preacher and the leading exponent of early-Stuart Anglican pietism.
56
  
John Guy has argued that late Elizabethan bishops believed ‘the prerogative 
was an administrative tool which could and should be exploited and expanded to 
improve the revenues and increase the power of the government’.57 Guy may be 
correct, but almoner ambitions seem to have been both more modest and loftier for 
they had to take account of moral management and spiritual regeneration as well as 
political conformity. Almoners were royal appointees, but almoner and monarch alike 
were the servants of God’s purpose in caring for the life of the one body politic.58 As 
Susan Brigden reminds us, ‘The great household was also a religious community 
which must work for its own salvation and that of its lord.’59 As agents of the mercies 
that made up the all-embracing rule of God, almoners were obliged to take account of 
the great and the small for ‘the divine rule over all things comprehends not only the 
vast and majestic tracts of the cosmos, but is particular and scrupulous in its personal 
attention to the small and the seemingly insignificant’.60 Almoners dealt not only with 
the apparent minutiae of suicides’ debt and credit, able to sue ‘but for the value of 
twelve-pence’, but also with stabilising the moral balance of the whole realm.61 
One way was through benevolence, for almsgiving went with prayer and 
penance as special means to enjoy the goodness of God and as ‘remedies against the 
World and the Devil’.62 Felicity Heal suggests that Tudor bishops as a whole were 
active givers, both by direct cash or food doles through their own almoners and by 
endowing charitable projects of social value such as schools and other aids to learning 
and culture.
63
 Almoners could spend on beneficence funds derived from forfeitures 
and other sources of revenue, including solicited or voluntary donations. One 
disbursement listed in the churchwardens’ accounts for South Newington in 
Oxfordshire is 6/8 to the king’s almoner (Anthony Watson, 1603) in 1604.64 The 
almoner’s work as an agent of ‘charity’ went far beyond this to encompass the 
discharge of both spiritual and material debts.
65
 The equation with benevolence, 
which originated in the seventeenth century and which became the more widely 
accepted, if specialised, meaning of ‘charity’ in the eighteenth century, picked out 
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only a part of the medieval and early modern conception. Late medieval charity was 
seen as a state of Christian harmony (amity and peace), contributed to by many deeds, 
with compassionate giving of alms just one. The post-Reformation almoner acted to 
express a conservative emphasis on good works, ceremonies and charity, which 
perpetuated the clerical ideals of the Catholic Middle Ages.
66
  
Charity remained central to the efficacy of religious observances, but the 
Protestant agenda to educate and reform individuals was based around a different 
understanding of that ideal, because intercession for the soul of the deceased no 
longer figured. In its place was a powerful component of social and moral 
management. In this the Tudor and Stuart almoner’s mission (in the full religious 
meaning of the word) was to offer a compassionate resolution to disputes that 
embodied justice, charity and dignity in a social sense and ‘penitence, forgiveness and 
grace’ in a religious one.67 From the viewpoint of most ordinary English people, the 
royal almoner was not a direct agent of government, but a semi-independent enforcer 
of financial penalties against a deed (suicide) that most regarded as wrong, a popular 
giver to good causes from the proceeds and a valued settler of disputes that might 
arise over the distribution of assets. His acts of charity had a religious rationale and 
the concept of Christian welfare was widely conceived to include neighbourly love as 
well as a loving affinity between God and man.
68
 Indeed, throughout the early modern 
period the connotations of charity, like those of public welfare, were ‘almost 
boundless’.69 
Part of the almoner’s job concerned material wealth or the ‘goods of fortune’ 
and part the less tangible ‘goods of the mind’ (and soul) that were charity, harmony 
and love.
70
 When it came to the former, almoners wanted disclosure rather than actual 
surrender of assets and, as a complaint against the widow of John Harrison put it in 
1605, for the relatives ‘to yeald composition for his sayd goods and chattels’.71 Paying 
a small fee to the almoner or his deputy for the right to the forfeited assets was the 
usual way of handling the affairs of a felo de se. On the occasions it can be 
documented this usually amounted to 5-10% of assets: higher than probate fees (1-
3%) but understandable since suicide was a sin and a crime.
72
 With hundreds of 
suicides a year reported to assize judges or King’s Bench by the Elizabethan period 
(as required by 3 Hen. VII, c. 2), it is most unlikely that even the almoner’s appointed 
deputies (discussed below) administered directly the small and heterogeneous 
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‘baskets’ of forfeited goods that they knew about. Finding out what assets there were 
was hard enough without the costs of collecting and selling them, meaning that 
composition must have been the preferred route. Gathering in and giving out was a 
troublesome business and, when the destination was likely to be local, it is probable 
that a settlement was achieved locally too.
73
 Deodands, generally one small 
marketable item such as a knife or rope (or, more substantially in accidents, a horse, 
cart or boat), were routinely settled for cash by the almoner’s deputies.74 
In return for composition, an almoner’s grant authenticated the title of those 
with an interest in the moveable estate, for forfeiture put all into the crown’s hands. 
The process resembles a cross between compounding for a criminal offence and a 
non-standard probate of assets, for felones de se were ‘intestable’ and thus their 
families were in a sort of legal limbo from which the almoner’s grant released them.75 
The most obvious comparison is with the medieval procedure of amercement for 
offences, which Bellamy describes as ‘a bargain for release struck between the king 
and the offender’.76 For suicides the deal had to be done with survivors, but the 
mechanisms were the same. Bellamy notes that the crown was usually satisfied with a 
small sum by way of composition for forfeited felons’ goods, the exact amount 
determined by bargaining and/or an assessment by the accused person’s peers, such as 
presentment jurors; the manorial equivalent was known as an ‘affeeror’.77 As with 
court fines and remissions, the sums charged as composition were not fixed, but were 
apparently graded according to the ability to pay. Compositions were a sort of 
arbitrary (if small) tax or fine. 
On the frustratingly rare occasions when we can trace them, funds derived 
from the forfeitures of felones de se were hypothecated to charitable uses, bolstering 
the normative community as well as providing practical help.
78
 Gloucester city 
records contain a copy of a letter from the mayor and aldermen to the Lord Almoner 
in October 1579 about a grant he had made to them of the goods of James Morse, a 
citizen, tanner and felo de se.
79
 It records their thanks for £20 given by the almoner 
‘towarde the relief of the poore people’ of the city ‘in the tyme of the late plague 
here’. Hoping to recruit the almoner’s backing and a further donation, the city council 
noted that a former mayor was being pursued for allegedly seizing this money without 
warrant, a reminder of the competing claims to suicides’ estates. The Privy Council 
had intervened in July 1578 to prevent the corporation from continuing to withhold 
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Morse’s assets from his widow, as she had compounded with John Piers, Bishop of 
Salisbury (1576).
80
 The Gloucester case shows not only the process of taking, but also 
the context of giving. The city fathers had grand aims for public welfare and had 
obviously made their peace with the almoner. Despite affirming that ‘the estate of our 
Citie was not weaker theise many yeares’, they wanted to be in the vanguard of 
implementing new social policies, claiming they had already spent £30 towards 
building a House of Correction. They therefore asked for another part of Morse’s 
estate to be granted them (a lease of the Whitefriars within the city) and concluded by 
assuring the almoner that he ‘hath byn the begynninge of a very godly and charitable 
acte’.81 Like all early-modern secular authorities, Gloucester’s magistrates saw 
themselves as promoters and enforcers of religious messages.
82
 
The almoner was charged with enforcing what were seen as normal acts of 
piety. His giving was a personal gift as much as a simulation of what the dead person 
could have done, just as his desire equitably to settle the estate reflected the 
fundamental principles of intestate succession. The ends were what most people 
would (or should) have wanted, for Dick Helmholz finds that medieval testators were 
anxious ‘to have their debts set down and to ensure that payment was made as fairly 
as their assets permitted’.83 By making the act of charity a spiritual concern for both 
donor and recipient, the almoner performed a reflexive act designed to rehabilitate as 
much as to punish, to draw a line under the suicide and therefore to help restore social 
relations by reordering affairs and (up to a point) repairing reputation. That he did so 
publicly and officially invited communities into the process of reconciliation and 
adjustment. His intervention also prevented the ‘credit’ (reputation and means) of 
survivors being permanently harmed by a bad death.  
Almoners tried to make something positive from the act of suicide and they 
exemplified the centrality of charity-as-beneficence to the corporal works of mercy.
84
 
Following Aristotle and Aquinas, Lancelot Andrewes expressed the point about social 
obligation very well when expounding the sixth commandment. ‘Every man that 
liveth in a Society or Common-wealth is part thereof, and so not sui juris, at his own 
dispose, but societatis vel reipublicae, of the Society or Common-wealth where he 
lives, and therefore cannot injure or kill himself without detriment to the whole.’85 
Almoners sought to make right the social wrong of suicide. Investing social relations 
with a theological force, they demonstrated the wide range of spiritual and temporal 
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concerns that the Anglican Jeremy Taylor classed as Holy Living and the Puritan 
Richard Baxter later listed in his Christian Directory.
86
 These included the seven 
spiritual works of mercy: teaching the ignorant, helping the needy, chastising the 
sinful, comforting those who grieve, forgiving enemies, suffering pains and praying. 
In terms of broad function it would not be stretching the imagination too much to see 
his actions as a continuation of medieval indulgences issued to indicate some level of 
remission for sin, with the beneficiary not the dead person’s soul, but the reputation 
and wellbeing of his or her family.
87
 Paying a composition to have goods returned 
was in religious terms an act of atonement, penance or humiliation; in secular ones it 
was an act of homage, fidelity or obedience. The almoner recast past sinful or 
criminal events in terms of timeless and universal notions of harmony, mercy and 
charity.
88
 By fuelling or revitalising credit networks, donations also helped to further 
habits of reconciliation and dispositions of trust that Craig Muldrew has termed part 
of an ‘economy of obligation’.89 
This agenda stretched into decisions about what to do with forfeited goods, for 
forfeiting and re-granting had within it the flexibility to accommodate circumstances. 
A case from Elizabethan Kent demonstrates the motives behind the bargains that 
almoners struck, norms which would have commanded support from most English 
people, but which sometimes needed enforcement. John Whitfield of Tenterden, 
gentleman, killed himself and his two sons Clement and Harbert reached an 
‘agreement and composition’ with the almoner. Instead of the brothers and their 
children getting a third each of their father’s estate (the law gave the almoner the 
remaining third or ‘dead’s part’), the almoner allowed them to keep all £2,000 if they 
used just £100 to ransom James Woodward from the Turks. The sons reneged on the 
deal, though the almoner claimed he had ‘sondrie tymes very gentelly required’ the 
brothers, without success. His moral stance becomes clearer as the documents reveal 
that Woodward was not some random good cause. For John Whitfield had married 
Woodward’s mother and had agreed to care for his stepson under the terms of James’ 
father’s will. He had failed to fulfil his promise and dissipated the assets that should 
have been used to educate and prefer the boy; James and his other brothers had tried 
to secure administration of their late father’s estate after their mother died, but John 
Whitfield blocked them. James Woodward was step-brother to Clement and Harbert. 
Thus the almoner was trying to right an injustice that was far from unusual 
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(mistreatment of step-kin), but which in rhetoric and practice was perceived to be 
deeply unnatural.
90
  
The almoner’s function was primarily to ensure the orderly and equitable 
handling of a suicide’s affairs in a context where he pro Rege and the immediate 
family were only two out of a universe of creditors. The almoner was not simply a 
glorified tax collector, profiting from the misfortunes of families, but an agent in the 
implementation of what early modern people understood as good lordship and modern 
observers term social engineering. His role, as with all ecclesiastical justice, was 
remedy rather than retribution, continuing the Aristotelean emphasis on justice as a 
tool to correct relationships or to preserve equality in transactions between 
individuals.
91
 He exemplifies the aspiration that William Lambarde had of a 
magistrate to be as much ‘a Compounder as a Commissioner of the Peace’.92 Or, more 
suitable to his position, he can be seen as a Christian peacemaker, using hierarchy to 
enforce community.
93
 This was a role for the bishop that had emerged in late antiquity 
when he came to be seen as ‘a mediator and reconciler of disputes between members 
of his congregation’ and it continued to be his main judicial role in the Middle Ages.94 
Lord Henry Howard still supported this function against the Puritan line in A defense 
of the ecclesiastical regimente in Englande (1574): ‘As for dealing in civil causes, so 
far as they are annexed and coherent to a spiritual function, maintaining peace and 
keeping quiet in the country, I think it very profitable and requisite for every state’.95 
By persuasion, negotiation, mediation and adjudication the almoner helped to re-
create community against the multiple forces that constantly threatened to fragment 
it.
96
 To borrow from Christopher Marsh’s conception of community, his role was ‘part 
of an attempt to minimise the damage caused by inevitable differences of opinion, to 
settle or conceal divisions in the interests of maintaining a tolerable social existence 
and an underlying spiritual ideal’.97  
This role required both administrative ability and apparatus, but that furthered 
rather than detracted from its Christian purpose. Andrew Chibi has recently shown 
that the worldliness of Henrician bishops should not be exaggerated simply because 
they played a more obvious role in temporal government than was later to become the 
case. Tudor bishops in general were ‘both spiritually strong and bureaucratically fit’: 
their aptitude as administrators did not compromise their piety or their role as 
promoters of cooperation and reconciliation.
98
 Nor should their spiritual goals be 
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doubted because they dealt in money, whose circulation mattered more to them than 
its accumulation. Naturally almoners, like all bishops, varied in their cupidity. One 
envious writer thought in 1535 that Edward Fox (c.1532) ‘shall be a bishop, who had 
many good promotions’ (he was right on both counts), while John Milton famously 
described George Mountain (1619) as a ‘canary-sucking and swan-eating prelate’.99 
Yet there is no reason to question their credentials on this basis alone, even if few 
could match the charity, moral rectitude and selflessness of Lancelot Andrewes.
100
  
Of course, almoners got and spent money and some cash may have been 
creamed off - as every other Tudor and Stuart official seems to have done. The office 
conferred power and the potential to profit as well as confirming position. Throughout 
the sixteenth century the crown used various means to press bishops for money and, 
following Christopher Hill and R. B. Manning, Carol Loar has suggested that the 
reduction in their incomes may explain the increasing vigour with which Elizabethan 
and early Stuart almoners acted in pursuing their rights to forfeitures.
101
 Richard 
Fletcher (1591) is the most famous example of a financially embarrassed bishop-
almoner, even after he got an abatement of what he owed the crown in taxes on the 
strength of that office.
102
 Two years later while bishop of Worcester he was delegated 
to collect contributions from fellow bishops to help maimed soldiers.
103
 Others also 
follow Manning in seeing the episcopate under attack from the crown under 
Elizabeth, the aim being to limit the power bishops had as bishops and to increase that 
which they and others derived from the crown.
104
  
The financial effect of any such drive on almoners is impossible to document. 
This was an age of ‘fiscal pluralism’, when no single individual or body was 
responsible for receiving and accounting for royal revenues and some monies were 
never audited. Deodands and the goods of felones de se should have been accounted 
for to the almoner or the King’s Remembrancer, but Sheriffs hardly ever seem to have 
done so.
105
 The royal commission of 1552 was highly critical of how Sheriffs dealt 
with the effects of living convicts: ‘the profitts of felons goods being but xljli vjd 
within the whole realm, is very small and belike evill answered, for the sheriffs are 
charged therewith upon their own confession; and it were well that theschequer 
should comptroll him therein and certifie the value … yearly, by the which means the 
charge should be more assured for the king’.106 In this area at least the commission’s 
work had little effect and in the reign of Elizabeth the category ‘forfeitures on penal 
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statutes and felons’ goods sold’ amounted to between £25 and £1,200 annually among 
total receipts ranging from £136,000 to well over £600,000.
107
 As in the Middle Ages, 
significant proportions of certain categories of revenues were spent locally on alms, 
maintaining buildings and defences, or meeting the costs of justice, with sums 
received at Exchequer small.
108
 In this sense the almoner was formally authorised to 
do what many other officials did by default. 
Indeed the imputation that bishops were pocketing revenues goes against legal 
interpretations of almoners’ rights and duties, the formal letter of their grants and the 
charitable spirit in which they were made. Despite the murkiness of the sources, it is 
almost certainly a mistake to believe that the almoner channelled money to his 
monarch, for the crown’s aim was not to get money from him, but to spend it through 
him - or ideally to make him fiscally neutral, operating ‘without increasing charge or 
diminishing the certain revenue’.109 Early modern legal texts recognised the almoner’s 
role as a conduit. Michael Dalton’s Countrey justice was clear that, when it came to 
deodands, ‘the Almner hath no interest, as it seemeth in such goods, but hath only the 
disposition of the Kings almes, durante bene placito, so that the King may grant them 
to any other’.110 An early biography of Lancelot Andrewes explicitly states that he 
accounted for his income as almoner quite separately from his personal or Episcopal 
income (though his patent was sine computo), immediately giving out all the former 
in alms as well as being a noted donor to charity from his own pocket.
111
 Money was 
a tool for almoners, not an end in itself. Their greater involvement in handling 
suicides’ affairs under Elizabeth and the early Stuarts more likely came from demand 
for lordly intervention at a time of multiplying economic, social and legal interactions 
than it did from being strapped for cash. 
That almoners used a strong hand should no more detract from their aims than 
should the financial component of their work. Though they operated through courts 
like Star Chamber, Exchequer and Chancery to facilitate the enforcement of 
obligations, their justification and the means adopted were more concerned with 
moral responsibility and its breach, sin.
112
 One aspect was correction for ‘it is aswell 
the office of charitie to rebuke, punish, and correct them that bee evill, as it is to 
cherish and reward them that bee good and harmlesse’.113 To modern eyes the 
almoner sometimes looks like a bully as he reasoned, cajoled, threatened and 
sometimes coerced, but he acted as an ecclesiastic belonging to a church that regarded 
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compulsion as a sacred duty (albeit to bring people voluntarily to virtue) and he 
operated in a context where there was a clear moral obligation.
114
 Yet he relied less on 
naked power than on authority, embodying the fundamental relationship between 
religion and the law ‘as being equally concerned with the question of what it is that 
enables and sustains human community’.115 The almoner was an agent of good 
lordship, constrained by the practical difficulties of enforcing his rights in a polity 
based above all on willing co-operation; by legal prescriptions and findings; and by 
the unwritten rules that governed expectations between patron and client, lord and 
man, ruler and ruled, churchman and Christian.
116
 
Attributing an integrative and directive role to almoners more accurately 
represents their activities both in and out of court than does portraying them either as 
glorified tax gatherers or as mere agents of secular policy. Some court cases look like 
the almoner disciplining a family or neighbourhood, but on closer reading it becomes 
clear that they were about one version of community against another. When assessing 
claims to a suicide’s estate, MacDonald and Murphy privilege the interests of the 
nuclear family, as one might expect of modern Westerners. It is indeed tempting to 
believe that without almoner intervention matters would have been resolved more 
peacefully, equitably and cheaply. But any attempt to include, protect or favour one 
set of interests meant excluding, ignoring or depriving another and it was the tensions 
between these that the almoner tried to reconcile. Nor will it do to broaden the model 
to suggest that those the almoner prosecuted were trying to promote community over 
crown, for early-modern village studies have made it abundantly clear that residential 
groupings were not automatically solidarities, even against outside forces, and that no 
obvious ‘community’ (such as women) was without profound distinctions between 
members.
117
  
Suits involving the almoner give an impression of centre v. locality because of 
the oppositional postures required by the process of accusation and defence in court. 
What the charges and denials reveal are instead the tensions within local social and 
economic networks, differences of opinion rather than uniformity of purpose. The 
almoner was part of the solution to problems caused when survivors of a suicide took 
too narrow a definition of their role as members of a ‘common wealth’. Suicide 
created unity of aim for some interpersonal alignments, but disarray for others and it 
is from this confusion that the almoner sought to bring order, potentially reducing risk 
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and increasing certainty both for the individual and the group. The problem that some 
survivors had with forfeiture was not that the crown or other lord deprived them of 
material assets (though presumably they were no fonder of imposts than any other 
taxpayer), but that it took away choice about who to include in and who to exclude 
from distributions. For other survivors an outsider like the almoner, who could use his 
authority to solve local disputes and maintain social equilibrium, was as likely to be 
welcomed as undermined. 
The almoner intervened on occasions where survivors had used the interstices 
of law and community practice to organise do-it-yourself ways of dealing with the 
aftermath of a suicide. These attempts arose either because neighbours and family did 
not understand what forfeiture meant in practice or because they were not prepared to 
accept the outcome of the process of composition and the responsibilities it entailed. 
Indeed it is likely that many almoner interventions originated with creditors who felt 
excluded by an informal process of settlement that involved quick action and the 
cutting of corners. Impromptu compounding for debts owed to the deceased, or re-
granting bonds on new securities, took those assets out of the pool available to pay off 
creditors and thus defrauded them of settlement. The almoner’s intervention brought 
back into the process of clearing debt those left out of such private accommodations, 
which involved both gratuitous alienations and the preferential treatment of some 
creditors over others. The almoner and those who informed him acted not against 
principled defenders of family and locality, but against self-interested people whose 
vision of community was narrow rather than broad.  
That almoners used central courts does not necessarily make them instigators 
of centralisation, for they necessarily worked with interested parties in the localities. 
What appear to be central initiatives often turn out on closer inspection to be privately 
instigated processes. Almoner grants sometimes state explicitly their intention of 
creating a structure to help local people resolve claims rather than intervening 
personally, allowing the recipient to sue for recovery of assets in the almoner’s name 
before any Westminster court - provided he or she pay their own costs.
118
 Given how 
many other things the almoner had to do and how few assistants he had in this part of 
his work (below), instigation might come from creditors who sought to use the 
proffered self-image or ‘public transcript’ of authority (notably the idea of 
commonwealth) to manipulate the almoner into intervening in person or by proxy in 
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order to resolve competing claims on their terms. The almoner’s patent required him 
only periodically to enquire into the goods of felons of themselves and deodands, 
explaining why some of those liable might feel aggrieved that they were being singled 
out.
119
 
A London case exemplifies how such contests, when combined with 
apparently imperfect information, might cause to be prosecuted (for morally 
acceptable reasons) someone who seems to have been blameless. Simon Hudson, 
merchant-tailor of London, eviscerated himself in the Bridewell in March 1584, 
leaving a widow and two children allegedly destitute. The almoner, John Piers, 
wanted to give debts owing to the deceased to his widow, but those who apparently 
owed him money refused to pay. These included Anthony Clarke, a Huntingdonshire 
parson, who allegedly owed Hudson £100. Clarke’s defence was a mixture of robust 
denial, finely tuned sarcasm and easily verified counter-claim. He described the 
deceased as ‘a man of small creditt and lesse conscience’ who persuaded him to 
borrow money on his behalf, creating the appearance of a debt owing by Clarke to 
Hudson: ‘a naughtie and an ungracious person which well and plainely [appears] 
aswell by his ungodly and desperate end as by his wicked and ungracious lieff’. This 
was not an empty claim, for Clarke could cite a successful prosecution before the 
Court of Requests and another before the Guildhall court by a widow whom Hudson 
had cheated – which is why he was in Bridewell.120 Here the almoner or someone 
acting in his name appears to have got the wrong end of the stick, acting honourably 
but unwisely through being manipulated by the widow or her supporters.  
There are many other examples of comparable (and better guided) efforts to 
defend the weak. On one occasion the almoner granted a suicide’s goods to the man’s 
widow and her children ‘in alms’ and then stepped in to protect her against men who 
seized some of those goods, including a bedstead.
121
 On another in 1621 bishop 
George Mountain stood against a grasping local landowner and former employer of a 
suicide on the side of his widow.
122
 In a Welsh example a Jacobean almoner was 
recruited by local people as a counterweight to the allegedly heavy lordship of the 
countess of Pembroke and her bailiff.
123
 Thanks to the more devolved and militarised 
nature of government and society, lords in the north of England and on the Welsh 
Marches had more commonly been given or assumed extensive franchisal privileges 
that included the right to deodands and the goods of felons of themselves.
124
 Some 
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urban corporations also enjoyed these privileges, notably the city of York.
125
 A 
distinctive feature of almoner suits in these regions was their role in resolving 
disputes caused by competing lordship – while simultaneously asserting the almoner’s 
privileges and priorities. 
Sometimes the formal delegation of responsibility is recorded in almoner 
grants. Nicholas Baker, a yeoman from Somerton in Somerset, hanged himself in 
early May 1600 and was found felo de se. Anthony Watson, the queen’s almoner, 
assigned his goods and chattels, inventoried at £41-15-10, to Edward Hext, esquire of 
Netherham.
126
 The grant is a commission or delegation of responsibility to a nominee, 
which spoke of the ‘speciall trust and confidence’ the almoner placed in Hext. Made 
‘in Almes’, it required Sir Edward to use the assets recovered ‘to and for the onely 
benefitt relief and maynetenance of Joan Baker widdowe late wief of the said 
Nicholas Baker and of the two children’ of the marriage. The aim was protective, not 
exploitative. Hext was also lord of the manor of Somerton and the document 
explicitly stated that the ‘grante or composicon’ should not infringe on any rights he 
might have – a further reminder of the multiple interests in any suicide’s estate. Even 
without the almoner watching over him, Hext was not a man to take advantage of the 
weak. He was a prominent local justice with a strong sense of public obligation and, 
while militantly hostile to the idle, undeserving poor, he was a deeply religious man 
noted for giving to charity.
127
 He had the local knowledge to fine-tune administration 
of Baker’s assets and the local authority to make his decisions stick. 
If the delegation to Edward Hext demonstrates that the almoner was not 
omnipotent, the case of Anthony Clarke shows that he was not omniscient. Lack of 
reliable information explains the vagueness of many suits and, where replies survive, 
the often flat denial of those accused. That the almoner was sometimes poorly 
informed is barely surprising. Tom Barnes has written of the early Stuart almoner’s 
‘elaborate organization in London and the counties’, yet this exaggerates what was a 
thinly spread apparatus; in London there was only the sub-almoner with four yeomen 
and two grooms of the Almonry.
128
 When we can see them in action, almoners’ 
provincial deputies resemble consistorial ‘sub-apparitors’ or deputy summoners 
(known as ‘mandatories’ in the diocese of York), who performed a number of 
unpopular tasks, like delivering citations, ferreting out estates that might be subject to 
ecclesiastical probate and sequestrating the goods of the intestate.
129
 Brian Woodcock 
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memorably called them ‘a kind of ecclesiastical gestapo’.130 If official deputy 
almoners were as common as church-court apparitors there may have been one per 
deanery in the early sixteenth century, but the wording of the documents suggests that 
most counties except Yorkshire had only one deputy almoner at a time (or escheator 
or feodary for that matter), though assistants may have been recruited on an ad hoc 
basis.
131
 For example, the deputy almoner in Cumberland in 1621 and 1624 was 
Cuthbert Orfeur, who in various documents was styled as royal escheator for 
Cumberland and Westmorland (1603; an appointee of the Lord Treasurer) and royal 
feodary there (1636; an appointee of the master of the Court of Wards).
132
 Such jobs 
probably circulated among local gentry: the escheator was appointed for a year at a 
time and could only hold office once every three years. Yet in the sixteenth-century 
north and in Wales gentlemen themselves were few and localised; Northumberland 
had just 118 in 1528.
133
 Thus in a Cumberland case of 1550 the deputy was a yeoman 
and similarly in a Pembrokeshire case pursued by Marian almoner Francis Malet; in 
an Elizabethan one it becomes clear that the deputy almoner for Pembrokeshire also 
covered Cardigan.
134
 Instead of using designated bureaucrats, who were few, English 
government worked at the grassroots by exploiting traditions of group accountability, 
notably through ad hoc commissions of responsibility for administering or resolving 
disputes to individuals like Edward Hext.
135
  
Even as he tried to deal with uncertainty and distrust on behalf of others, the 
almoner himself suffered many of the difficulties he was trying to resolve. Some of 
his Star Chamber suits failed; others list only one specified item or even just a vague 
conviction that someone was holding out. This level of uncertainty is unsurprising for 
two reasons. First, formal court suits represent only the more intractable cases, tinged 
by dissimulation, distrust and obduracy. Second, prosecutions seem to have been 
based on notifications by an informant or creditor of the deceased, for the 
governmental and judicial resources of Tudor and Stuart England lacked depth.
136
 
Notionally at least almoners could have been informed about suicides from the 
inquests reported to King’s Bench and inquest verdicts transmitted usually mention 
who had custody of deodands, goods and chattels (some have inventories attached); 
deputy almoners sometimes signed off assets.
137
 Some deputies may have worked 
closely with coroners. Yet King’s Bench was a court of public record and information 
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derived from it could propel a suit not only by a royal official, but by any interested 
subject.  
Judging by the often long interval between suicide and court case, almoner 
suits were reactive rather than proactive: unsurprising as charity, like royal mercy and 
divine grace, had to be requested. Had prosecutions come from deputy almoners with 
their ears to the ground we might expect them to have been brought much more 
quickly as they explained to families what their options were and assessed face-to-
face survivors’ attitudes to the restrictions on their situation. As Barnes notes, 
Jacobean (and earlier) almoner prosecutions before Star Chamber were mostly 
‘discovery actions’, where he sought, by examining witnesses and defendants, to 
determine what goods the forfeited person possessed, where they were located and 
how much they were worth, and thus to compel submissions of decedents’ estates to 
court jurisdiction.
138
 Like Chancery and Exchequer, Star Chamber was useful for 
uncovering evidence to be used in another court and for tracing and charging 
property.
139
  
In a prolonged period of legal flux c.1530-1700, when common-law remedies 
to fundamental issues of debt and credit were still developing and when conceptions 
of the law only slowly changed from ‘law-as-professional-custom’ to ‘law-as-text’, 
the almoner exemplifies both the problems litigants faced and the avenues open to 
them. For example, John Piers sued 12 debtors to the earl of Northumberland (a 
suicide under suspicious circumstances in the Tower of London in 1585) before 
Exchequer c.1586/7. He had a written obligation from just one. His request for a 
subpoena is therefore prefaced: 
In consideration whereof and for that your orator [the almoner] knoweth not 
the certeine tymes nor places of the said severall Contractes nor such other 
needfull requisites for the proofe therof and of everie of them as that he is 
able by the stricte course of the Common lawes to meynteine suite account 
for the same and yet doth verelie beleve that the parties aforesaid and every 
of them opon theire othes woulde confesse and acknowledge the said dewties 
debtes and contractes to be unpaid and unperformed.
140
 
Only an equity or prerogative court could do this because, like the medieval church 
courts, it depended on the debtor’s soul and conscience. Equity courts like Chancery 
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and Exchequer were the most dynamic branch of the law in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, acting to remedy some of the ‘immense and scattered range of 
particularised injustices produced by the common law’.141 In a Marian Chancery suit 
deputy almoner William Ottye complained openly that he was ‘without remeady at 
the comon lawe’ when trying to collect a debt owed to a felo de se.142 As Ellesmere 
affirmed: ‘The office of Chancellor is to correct men’s consciences for frauds, 
breaches of trust, wrongs and oppressions, of what nature soever they be, and to 
soften and modify the extremity of the law’.143  
Sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century creditors needed all the help they 
could get in trying to secure assets, for they were faced with many problems. The 
solutions that had served the Middle Ages relied largely on ecclesiastical processes 
and compulsitors or their manorial equivalents. Ethical principle allowed the 
enforcement of oral agreements that had the weight of oaths, the church claiming that 
invocation of the deity in oaths to pay gave them a locus in matters of debt and credit 
as well as testamentary affairs.
144
 Its jurisdiction in such matters faded rapidly in the 
early sixteenth century and, until the development of the action known as assumpsit or 
‘trespass on the case’, the common law offered no remedy for debts on simple 
(informal or verbal) contract, as most obligations were.
145
 The problem was 
particularly acute in the case of executors and administrators because they could 
hardly swear to such a debt – as living debtors could when following a procedure 
called ‘wager of law’, referred to in the Exchequer case just cited.146 A judgement in 
the Court of Common Pleas during the 1540s described an executor as like an 
almoner on behalf of the dead, but by the same token the royal almoner acted like a 
good executor.
147
 
Almoners dealt with the allegedly fraudulent distribution of assets prior to or 
soon after death, for collusion and deceit were persistent problems with all early 
modern debt and credit relationships.
148
 Like early bankruptcy law, forfeiture for 
suicide was designed to deal with a worst-case scenario.
149
 Tudor and Stuart 
bankruptcy law (1542, 1570, 1604, 1623, 1662) was based on the presumption that 
merchants’ and traders’ creditors needed to be protected against people who were at 
best evasive and at worst fraudulent.
150
 For example, 13 Eliz. c. 5 banned property 
transfers between crime and conviction designed to defraud the crown. Debt was an 
issue of character. Over time, laws established procedures for summoning parties 
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suspected of concealing property, creating a common agent for seizing and 
administering assets and establishing the idea that creditors shared a community of 
interests.
151
 During the seventeenth century developments in the common law 
rendered the almoner’s or other lord’s intervention increasingly superfluous by 
making inroads ‘upon the immunity of executors, so that eventually the general rule 
came to be that liability for breach of informal contracts was passively transmissible 
to personal representatives’.152 At the same time, assumpsit allowed the recovery of 
damages by reason of the breach or non-performance of contract.
153
 In contrast with 
an ecclesiastical or equity action, assumpsit alleged that a debtor’s deceit had 
occasioned specific (usually financial) damage, which could be compensated. In a 
period of legal change, the almoner helped with the pressing and pervasive problem of 
dealing with the post mortem identification, appropriation and distribution of assets. 
He employed the force of his authority and the use or threat of equitable or 
prerogative litigation to resolve situations of lying and selfishness, concealment and 
seizure, blending traditional ways of bringing about reconciliation with the new early-
modern emphasis on formally waging law.
154
  
 
The almoner in Ireland enjoyed similar privileges to his English equivalent, 
though his political role was conceived differently. When he made Christopher 
Hampton, Church of Ireland archbishop of Armagh, the first royal almoner for Ireland 
in 1617, James I allowed him £100 annually ‘for his pains’ from fines on recusants 
and those absent from public worship; 5% of fines of £20 or more imposed by courts; 
and deodands and forfeitures of suicides. Other than the £100, income from all 
specified sources was to be disposed as the almoner ‘thought fit for public works and 
charitable uses’.155 Two years later the archbishop asked to have his patent broadened 
and ‘he farther enabled (after the building of churches and doing such things as by the 
said patent & said Instructions he is limited to perform), to undertake other works, 
both full of charity and no less necessary for the good of that people than 
advantageous to the commonwealth’. The petition was granted, proceeds ‘to be 
applied to pious uses solely at the Archbishop’s discretion and without account’.156  
James’ letters make explicit his vision of the Irish almoner as an agent of 
charity within a broadly conceived understanding of public welfare. Given the 
different political and religious complexion of Ireland after Plantation the king also 
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wanted Hampton to bring the Irish church into closer alignment with the English and 
he had been sent to Ireland quite explicitly as ‘an advocate of conformity to the royal 
will in matters ecclesiastical and civil’ including prominent guardianships.157 
Hampton, a former royal chaplain, had asserted the primacy of Armagh over Dublin 
and his successor James Ussher (1625) consolidated this.
158
 The crown was much 
more important to many areas of English life than Irish and the broader financial base 
in the almoner’s patent reflects the need for a local agent to extend the royal hand and 
strengthen Protestantism: there was more to do both in connecting centre and locality 
and in containing ideological divisions. Perhaps there was also awareness that poor 
relief in Ireland (covered by the same legislation as England, but never effectively 
implemented) was likely to need far more help. The grant of recusancy fines is unique 
to the Irish almoner and a possible outcome was to enhance rather than reduce 
sectarian tensions - as tithes did. Perhaps the almoner took from Catholics and gave to 
Protestants, but since his grant was also sine computo there is no way of telling. The 
primate nevertheless told a commission of inquiry sent into Ireland in 1622 that he 
received only £500 a year from these fines whereas the commissioners reckoned they 
could be worth £10,000 Irish if properly pursued and accounted for. Pursuing 
instructions to investigate how Ireland might ‘live of her own’, the commissioners 
thought the problem lay with Sheriffs, churchwardens and others charged with 
enforcement and collection. Initially Hampton had taken a moderate line, 
compounding with recusants in his own archdiocese, and it may be that he and his 
successors saw the tension between their Christian duty and attempts to use them as 
political tools, leaning more to the former than the latter.
159
 
If Ireland’s almoner was comparable with England’s, the same figure in 
Scotland was in important ways utterly different. The word ‘almoner’ was used 
similarly in late-medieval Scotland to describe a person charged with distributing to 
the poor from a great household.
160
 A royal or general almoner is mentioned in the 
thirteenth century and Martin Wane was the king’s ‘grand almoner’ and ambassador 
in 1471.
161
 There are payments in alms detailed under ‘discharges: elimosina regis’ 
among the accounts of the Lord High Treasurer for 1507-8, 1511-12 and 1512-13.
162
 
Payments appear occasionally thereafter. One in 1537 by dean John Wilson to the 
‘master almosar’ (Sir James Haswell, who supervised James V’s chaplains), comes in 
1537.
163
 Sixteenth-century master almoners were usually lesser lay nobles: men of 
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ability, piety and learning who commonly sported the title ‘Mr’ (magister) to show 
they were university educated. The office reached its zenith under Mr Peter Young of 
Seton, appointed king’s ‘elemosinare’ in October 1577 when aged just 34. Young 
belonged to the king’s household: he ate at the gentlemen servants’ table after the 
king had dined. The queen’s almoner in the 1590s was Mr Steven Wilson, parson of 
Moffat, and master almoner to the children’s household was Sir William Laing.164 
Young was a firm Calvinist and a formidable political figure. He was the 
king’s tutor (1572-81, following the great George Buchanan), an ambassador (1587 – 
the same year he was made almoner for life), a Privy Councillor from 1593 (the same 
year he was charged with enforcing an act against beggars) and a Lord of Exchequer 
(1595); he was knighted in 1605.
165
 Young was a shrewd tactician who won and 
retained the king’s favour even when distrusted by better-born counsellors. He 
elevated the almoner’s role through his personality, tailoring it as a conduit for his 
strong position with the king, while aware that his political and social standing was 
weaker among the traditional nobility. Thomas Randolph said that Young was 
‘honest, wise and learned, but judged by some to be unfit to have a chief place, being 
of no great birth nor by office of any great calling’ – a statement that makes clear the 
lesser standing of the royal almoner in Scotland.
166
 The Earl Marischal refused to 
travel with Young on a mission to Denmark, having been ‘perswaded, and it is true, 
that the sayd Peter will robbe him of all his honour, beinge an ambycyowse fellow, 
and aqaynted there, and specyally by his pryvy instruccyons’.167 Young’s political 
strength lay with the royal households: his wife, Elspeth Gibb, was a gentlewoman in 
Anna’s household (the queen’s official almoner from 1603 was the famous historian 
and cleric John Spottiswoode) and his daughter Marie was a well-regarded servitor in 
the queen’s chamber.168 During the 1590s his deputies were Mr John Scrimgeour and 
then Mr John Young.  
As a multi-functionary with educational, ambassadorial and political roles, 
Young looks superficially like an early Tudor almoner. Yet Scotland’s royal almoner 
never had the same privileges over deodands (which were almost unknown there) or 
the goods of suicides as his English counterpart, a reminder that the nature of kingship 
and the use of the royal prerogative differed in the two countries. Very occasionally a 
pre-Reformation almoner received a grant of a specific forfeiture of goods following 
felony (known in Scotland as a ‘donation of escheat’), but this was not normal 
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practice. For example, in 1549 Mr Robert Auchmowtye, steward and master almoner, 
received the forfeiture of a fugitive killer and in 1550 that of a bastard (those not 
legitimated during their lifetime could not bequeath property).
169
 Peter Young 
received wardships in 1578, 1580 and 1583.
170
 These were more administrative tasks 
than payments, for analysis of the gifting of donations of escheats for suicide to 
courtiers and royal servants shows they were conceived as an extension of personal 
government rather than a means of personal enrichment. Young was certainly 
rewarded by James VI, but through direct personal grants of lands and titles rather 
than indirectly as some offshoot of ‘fiscal feudalism’. In 1580 he received a grant to 
buy land ‘in consideration of his lang trew and thankfull service’ and another 
substantial award in 1587; he also received a ‘feall’ or fee of £200 a year payable in 
equal instalments twice yearly by the king’s ‘comptrollare’ from ‘the reddiest of his 
hienes propertie’ to cover food and drink for his servants.171 
Acts of beneficence took place most obviously at the point when forfeiture of 
a suicide was granted (both in who received it and how much composition they had to 
pay), rather than in the ultimate spending of any proceeds. What money was extracted 
in settlement went to ‘the procurator fiscal of the court for his majesties use’ or 
directly to the Scottish Exchequer or to a subordinate lord’s coffers, for as in England 
suitably franchised lords also had rights of forfeiture.
172
 Income from felony forfeiture 
in Scotland was a branch of the king’s ‘ordinary revenue’, also known as the ‘fisc’ or 
the sovereign’s public purse.173 That incomes from escheats as well as payments to 
almoners ‘for the Kingis elimose deliverit to him and his servituris at diverse tymes be 
the comptgewar’ were commonly registered in central accounts distinguishes 
Scotland from England.
174
 Scotland’s royal almoner was on a tighter rein and his 
budget more closely monitored. The late medieval and early modern Scottish 
Exchequer did, however, use income from feudal casualties and incidents or accidents 
to pay out ‘alms’, broadly construed to include gifts and royal household expenses.175 
Some of these may have been used for the same ends as the English almoner was 
obliged to do, though what little evidence there is points to giving on special 
occasions to specified causes without the large-scale, systematic and open-ended 
charitable remit that the Lord Almoner had south of the Border.
176
  
Scotland’s master almoner was therefore just another great lord’s charity 
giver. The conception of government was different in Scotland from other parts of the 
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British Isles and the master almoner illustrates this, remaining a shadowy household 
figure even when operating on an international stage. Peter Young was unusual 
because being royal master almoner was generally the highest office an incumbent 
ever held, whereas in England it was commonly a stage of advancement to greater 
things. John Guthrie, bishop of Moray, was made almoner in Scotland at Charles I’s 
coronation at Edinburgh in 1633 so he could distribute specially coined silver ‘in 
token of joy’ – and preach in a surplice, to the scandal of Calvinists.177 Part of 
Charles’ disastrously ill-judged statement about a British monarchical church, he is 
the only known Episcopal royal almoner in Scottish history.  
Understandings of Christian charity may well have been comparable, but the 
ways they were realised in practice differed profoundly between the component parts 
of Britain. Both institutional structures and social alliances played a part in this. Early 
modern Scotland never developed the system of generalised parish-based rating that 
was at the core of English poor relief from Elizabethan times. The impotent poor had 
to rely on neighbourly help or on the charity of the wealthy: crown policy towards its 
almoner and the poor did nothing substantially to change this.
178
 Nor is it likely that 
the nobility would have brooked active social management of the kind the English 
almoner supervised. Nobles made the Scottish Reformation – and made it work for 
them. When lordship was needed it came from the crown or an aristocrat rather than a 
franchised cleric. The crown was every bit as important to Scottish life as it was to 
English, but it did not operate in the same way and the different roles of almoners 
demonstrate this. When allowances to the poor were made from Queen Anne’s 
charity, they were charged to the civil list.
179
 A further difference is that the transition 
from ecclesiastical to secular ways of handling debt and credit was achieved very 
quickly in the 1560s and 1570s, partly by allowing canon law influences to persist as 
the pre-Reformation church courts quickly changed into the post-Reformation 
Commissary Courts. The Lords of Session presided over the court of last resort in all 
civil cases well before the Reformation, combining Scotland’s own common law with 
equity into a single system headed by ‘the Session’ or Court of Session.180  
After Young’s death in 1628 the office was never the same again and became 
largely honorific, granted eventually to a prominent but politically insignificant 
clergyman (as also seems to have been the case in the late Middle Ages). For 
example, John Law, minister of St Giles (Edinburgh) replaced James Kirkton, 
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minister of the Tolbooth parish (Edinburgh) in 1700; the holder for Scotland from 
1713 was Mr William Hamilton, professor of divinity in the University of Edinburgh, 
who was succeeded in 1727 by Mr James Hart, minister of Greyfriars Church, 
Edinburgh.
181
 As in later Stuart and Hanoverian England these men were important 
mainly for dispensing ecclesiastical patronage.
182
 Their financial base remained 
exiguous. Dr Alexander Carlyle was obliged to petition in 1777 for £167 he had lost 
as a result of his late deputy’s incompetence.183 
 
The function and status of the royal almoner in Ireland and Scotland tells us 
much about the differences between the component parts of the British Isles. This 
article has focused primarily on England, where the almoner’s role illuminates central 
issues of lordship, law and community in a period of social, legal, religious and 
political change. Chris Dyer writes of late medieval England: ‘The strength of the 
village perhaps lay not in its organic harmony, but in its success as a coercive 
organization in containing the quarrels in its midst.’184 Lords, church and community 
were the agencies that resolved conflict and recreated trust - often from within, but 
sometimes from without as the almoner did. Lordship remained important during the 
early modern period as recourse to the law grew, with early modern English and 
Welsh (and probably also Irish) almoners helping to design and stabilise what 
Muldrew terms a ‘negotiated community’ that required constant management in 
pursuit of harmony between members. It was only well into the seventeenth century, 
when legal changes made external manipulation of debt and credit relations less 
necessary, when provisions for the poor became increasingly based on parish rating 
and benevolence more discriminating and calculating, and when political and 
ideological changes reduced the acceptability of lordly intervention that figures like 
the English almoner became less important in enforcing ‘charity’.185  
Religion too was changing. As John Bossy observes, the weakening of the 
idea that society is divided between friends and enemies (and the corresponding rise 
of the concept of independent actors) reduced the ideal and reality of charity. 
Practices of community were themselves increasingly difficult to maintain in the face 
of fragmented Protestantism.
186
 Richard Wunderli writes of a growing assumption 
‘that secular authorities can and ought to solve certain legal problems which had 
formerly been ecclesiastical problems’.187 He denies that this secularization is either 
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anti-religious or non-religious. ‘It may represent the desire to make the state a more 
active partner within the Christian body to enforce Christian norms.’188 During the 
transition, secular and ecclesiastical agencies, feudal law and canon law were 
intertwined in pursuit of this goal.  
Finally, society and politics were changing. During the seventeenth century 
the intervention of almoners and other lords as arbitrators, adjudicators and mediators 
altered, great lordship being replaced by lesser as the mighty became more focused on 
the royal court and their inferiors came to be seen as more knowledgeable, diligent 
and trustworthy agents. Thus early-Tudor lords and bishops gave way to Elizabethan 
and later gentry, judges and lawyers; from the mid-seventeenth century landed elites 
came largely to withdraw altogether from residence, local government and social 
engineering; nor was there a royal almoner between 1645 and 1660, obliging people 
to look for lordship and benevolence elsewhere.
189
 The weakening of manorial 
structures and the corresponding emergence both of the parish as a secular 
administrative body and of the oligarchic vestry to run it changed the dialectic of 
lordship and community into an exercise in the imposition of state authority through 
lesser local agents.
190
 With the development of what Muldrew terms a ‘juridical 
community’, the discretionary handling of forfeiture was augmented and then 
displaced by more impersonal legal ways of ensuring co-operation and settling 
disputes.
191
 From c.1650 law itself became less acceptable as a way of doing things 
and ‘the great litigation decline’ set in, leading eventually to the structured 
predictability of the ‘architectural community’ in the later eighteenth century and 
beyond.
192
 The idea that outsiders should play any role in many areas of life that were 
being re-construed as ‘private’ also gained ground and the change is reflected in a 
shift in coroners’ verdicts on suicide between c.1660 and 1760 from predominantly 
felo de se – which activated lordship - to largely non compos mentis – which required 
no external intervention. The almoner can still be found using the central courts in the 
late seventeenth century (except of course Star Chamber, abolished in 1641) but after 
the Restoration the crown began increasingly to assign forfeitures of felones de se 
using a warrant under the sign manual to church courts to grant letters of 
administration to creditors on their presenting a memorial requesting this.
193
  
The English almoner remained an important figure at court under the later 
Stuarts and Hanoverians. John Sharp (1703) enjoyed Queen Anne’s fullest 
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confidence, possibly because he confined himself to ecclesiastical matters; in contrast, 
his successor George Smalridge (1714) lasted less than a year under George I.
194
 
Almoners’ patents continued to grant deodands and the goods of felones de se up to 
the appointment of Samuel Wilberforce on 15 December 1847.
195
 Deodands had been 
actively awarded by coroners’ inquests right up to their abolition in the previous year. 
Suicide forfeitures on the other hand had long ceased to be a significant source of 
income, even if forfeiture for felony was not ended until 1870. In any case later 
Georgian legal writers assumed that in practice proceeds of these feudal incidents no 
longer went to the almoner, but were ‘appropriated as part of the casual revenues of 
the Crown’ – as they always had been in Scotland and as they seem to have been in 
Ireland before 1617.
196
 By the end of George III’s reign, if not before, Lords Almoner 
had been reduced once more to their original role as simple household givers. 
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